Chinese Advances and Setbacks in Colombia by Evan Ellis, Robert
www.ssoar.info
Chinese Advances and Setbacks in Colombia
Evan Ellis, Robert
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Evan Ellis, R. (2017). Chinese Advances and Setbacks in Colombia. IndraStra Global, 5, 1-7. https://nbn-resolving.org/
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-52028-0
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Chinese Advances and Setbacks in Colombia | Author: Dr. R. Evan Ellis 
IndraStra Global Vol. 003, Issue No: 05 (2017) 0064 | ISSN 2381-3652 
1 | P a g e  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chinese Advances and Setbacks in Colombia 
 
By Dr. R. Evan Ellis 
 
Date of Publication: May 31, 2017 
Introduction 
 
In June 2017, the leadership of the Pacific Alliance will pass from Chile to Colombia, ushering 
in a year in which the later has the opportunity to reshape and inject new dynamism into, the 
block’s relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the rest of Asia. 
 
As in other parts of Latin America, Colombia’s relationship with the PRC in recent years has 
advanced in important, but uneven ways, largely beyond the attention of policymakers and 
scholars in the United States. 
 
Among Latin American countries, Colombia’s engagement with the PRC is particularly 
complex: Colombia enjoys a close security relationship with the United States, which could 
potentially impact and be impacted by Colombia’s commercial and military cooperation with 
China.  On the other hand, despite important U.S.-Colombia economic ties, Colombia is not 
economically bound to the United States to the same extent as are geographically closer states 
such as Mexico and the countries of Central America.  
  
Beyond its relationship with the United States, Colombia’s economy includes substantial urban 
markets such as Bogota, Medellin Cali, Cartagena, and Barranquilla, as well as important 
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primary product industries including petroleum, making the country attractive to Chinese 
investors. On the other hand, the country also has a well-developed, yet insular, manufacturing 
sector which often views Chinese companies as a threat, and which (although fragmented), is 
politically well-connected through a web of familial networks, facilitating resistance to attempts 
by Chinese companies to enter that market. 
 
PRC Commercial Activities in Colombia 
 
In Colombia, beginning in August 2006 with Sinopec’s joint venture with ONGC Videsh to 
purchase the Colombian operations of Omimex, the Chinese have established important 
footholds in the country in the petroleum, construction, manufacturing, telecommunications, and 
aviation logistics sectors, although in other areas, such as mining, agriculture and branch 
banking, China’s presence is less than that in other Latin American countries. 
 
In the petroleum sector, the purchase of Omimex was followed by Sinochem’s 2009 acquisition 
of Emerald Energy, with a drilling presence in Caquetá, an area then strongly influenced by the 
Colombian terrorist group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia (FARC).  The $15.5 
billion acquisition of the Canadian company Nexxenin 2012 by China National Offshore 
Drilling Company (CNODC) further expanded the PRC presence in the Colombian petroleum 
sector. 
 
Moreover, the entry of the Chinese national oil companies (NOCs) created an opportunity for 
PRC-based petroleum service companies such as Kerui, Great Wall, and CPEB to enter 
Colombia in service of their longstanding Chinese clients.  With the fall in oil prices since 2014 
however, a number of those companies, including Emerald Energy, have reportedly fallen on 
hard times.Moreover, with the exception of Kerui, which has done relatively well in the 
Colombian market, many of the PRC-based petroleum service companies have experienced 
difficulties in winning clients beyond the Chinese NOCs. 
 
As elsewhere in the region, China’s activities in the Colombian petroleum sector have also 
created security challenges for PRC-based companies.  These include the kidnapping of three 
Chinese employees in Caquetá in June 2011 while working on an oil project, although they 
were freed a year later. 
 
With respect to mining, although some smaller Chinese companies have engaged in exploratory 
activities in the sector, none of the large state-owned Chinese companies have entered, as they 
have in Peru and elsewhere in the region.  As in Peru, however, individual Chinese citizens have 
been involved in illegal mining activities in Colombia. 
 
In agriculture, in 2008, small Chinese companies previously pursued investment in agricultural 
land in the Colombian departments of Guaviare, Caquetá, Meta, Cauca, Valle del Cauca, and 
Nariño.  Yet political attention brought by Colombian Senator Jorge Robledo regarding the 
ownership of land by foreigners effectively blocked the deals.  Since that time, Chinese 
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investors have not seriously pursued a presence in the sector.  Nonetheless, as in the Southern 
Cone, where similar Chinese attempts to acquire land have been blocked, the Chinese have 
also sought to acquire companies in Colombia with agricultural capabilities of interest to them. 
 In 2014, for example, China National Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs Corporation (COFCO), 
entered into talks to acquire a fishmeal company in Barranquilla and the Colombian meat 
company Zenu, although neither deal was culminated. 
 
Although Chinese agricultural investment in Colombia, per se, has not been successful, in May 
2016, during the visit of Chinese Primer Li Keqiang to Colombia, the two sides 
reportedly discussed infrastructure projects which could make the savannah of eastern 
Colombia more accessible and productive, potentially setting the stage for future Chinese 
investment in the agriculture sector, insofar as the peace agreement with the FARC 
allows Colombia to make substantial progress in controlling violence in the countryside. 
 
Some of the most substantial progress by Chinese companies in Colombia has been in the 
manufacturing and retail sector, leveraging local Colombian partners. 
   
With respect to motorcycles, the Chinese company Jincheng has had a factory in Barranquilla 
since 1998, while the company Jialing has assembled motorcycles in Cali since 1997, two of the 
first production facilities for Chinese products in Colombia. 
 
Beyond these pioneering manufacturing ventures for Chinese products in Colombia, the  Corbeta 
Group has successfully brought into the country a series of Chinese products, including 
motorcycles under the brand AKT and Foton commercial vehicles.  Working with its Chinese 
partners, the Corbeta Group established a motorcycle assembly facility in Medellin, and in 
February 2015, following some delay, opened a final assembly facility for Foton light trucks 
outside of Bogota.  The Chinese company Chang’an is reportedly evaluating the opening of an 
auto plant in Colombia as well. 
 
Beyond these examples, Chinese car brands Great Wall, Geeley, JBC and JCB have entered 
Colombia through their local partner Derco, while Chery has entered through Cinascar, and 
FAW trucks through the distributor Dinatrans.  By contrast, JAC motors, has largely entered the 
country on its own. Unlike Foton, however, none of the latter has announced concrete plans to 
build a factory in Colombia. 
 
By contrast to Chinese manufacturers, the experience of small Chinese merchants in Colombia’s 
retail sector has been less positive.  In recent years, a number of Chinese investors set up retail 
stores in Bogota and elsewhere in the country, often paying cash to buy or construct the facilities, 
while importing goods from the PRC at prices that undercut Colombian merchants long 
established in the area.  In June 2015, and again in May 2016, Colombian shopkeepers in the 
neighborhood of San Victorino captured nationwide attention by staging high-visibility public 
protests against their Chinese competitors, arguing that the latter had an unfair competitive 
advantage due to their sale of contraband merchandise.  
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In the construction sector, Chinese companies have been impeded by the same labyrinth of 
obstacles as their Colombian and foreign competitors have faced, including a demanding 
procurement process and local interests seeking a portion of any project taking place in their 
territory.  Yet beyond such obstacles, PRC-based companies have also faced resistance from 
established Colombian business groups which reportedly wish to prevent them to gain a foothold 
in the sector.  One example is arguably Sinohydro’s loss of the Ituango hydroelectric 
project in Antioquia in 2010.Other major Chinese infrastructure proposals for Colombia, such 
as 2011 plan to build a “dry canal” to connect the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the country, 
have never advanced past the proposal stage. 
 
Despite such difficulties, a handful of important Chinese companies, including Sinohydro and 
China Harbour, have persisted and gained experience in Colombia, and have begun to win work. 
 In 2008, theSinomach subsidiary China United Engineering Corporation won a $236 million 
contract for the construction of the GECELCA III coal-fired power plant in Córdoba, 
although it experienced considerable delays in implementation, with associated legal 
challenges.  In September 2015 China Harbour was awarded a contract for the construction 
of a highway in the Department of Antioquia under the streamlined acquisition rules of 
Colombia’s new “4th Generation Highways” private-public partnership.  Nonetheless, securing 
the required permissions from local communities along the route have delayed China Harbour 
from completing the project. Similarly, although the Chinese company Sinohydro lost out to the 
Brazilian firm Odebrecht in a contract to dredge and enhance the navigability of Colombia’s 
Magdalena river, when Odebrecht ran into difficulties over its use of bribes to win contracts in 
the country, Sinohydro made an offer to the Colombian government to take over the project. 
 
In addition to the aforementioned cases, as noted previously, during Chinese Primer Li 
Keqiang’s May 2016 trip to Colombia, at least two potentially significant infrastructure projects 
were discussed: improvements to Buenaventura, Colombia’s principal Pacific Coast port, and a 
highway improving access to the potentially productive agricultural land in the interior of the 
country.  To date, however, neither has advanced significantly. 
 
With respect to logistics, while neither China Shipping Company, nor Hutchison Whampoa have 
a significant presence in Colombia as they do in neighboring Panama, since March 2008 a 
partnership between Chinese airport operators “Capital Airport Holdings” and a local 
Colombian businessmen under the name “Air Plan” has operated the six airports around 
Medellin, including the region’s international airport, Rio Negro. 
 
With respect to telecommunications, the Chinese company Huawei, and to a lesser extent its 
Chinese rival ZTE, have established a presence as infrastructure service providers and vendors 
of telephones and communications equipment.  Thanks in part to its empowerment of Colombian 
management staff and other personnel, Huawei has arguably been the Chinese company which 
has most successfully adapted itself to the local market, including its sponsorship, since 
January 2015, of the popular local Santa Fe soccer club. 
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Nonetheless, even Huawei has had its share of problems in Colombia; a number of its Chinese 
workers have been robbed close to the company’s headquarters building in Bogota, reportedly 
including one of one of the company’s vice-presidents. 
 
With respect to radio and television, in 2014, a Chinese group reportedly came to Colombia 
expressing an interest in buying local television, radio, and newspaper outlets, although the 
deal never came to fruition. 
 
With respect to the financial sector, by contrast to states in the southern cone where Chinese 
banks such as ICBC and China Construction Bank have established significant branch banking 
ties, Chinese commercial banks have almost no presence in Colombia aside from representing 
and supporting their Chinese business partners and the electronic banking network Union Pay. 
 
Colombia Hesitatingly Looks to China 
 
On the Colombian side, interest in doing business with China and Chinese companies continues 
to grow, although in a limited fashion.  Among Colombian politicians and businessmen, interest 
in establishing a free trade agreement with the PRC is reportedly very low, despite Chinese 
interest and discussions at the political level. 
 
The number of participants in the China-Colombia Chamber of Commerce has grown from just 
over 30 five years ago, to 125 today, although only five of the companies are actually Chinese. 
 The Colombian business association ANDI, which principally represents manufacturers and 
other Colombian producers, is interested enough in China to maintain a knowledgeable 
mandarin-speaking professional, yet has not found sufficient interest among its members to do a 
major event on China in over four years. 
 
Colombia’s three Confucius institutes for teaching Chinese language and culture continue to 
attract students, yet have not expanded in number since the inauguration of the Confucius 
Institute in Jorge Tadeo Lozano University in 2013. 
 
At the governmental level, Colombia’s trade promotion organization ProColombia continues to 
have only one representative office in China, collocated with the embassy in Beijing, by 
contrast to most other major Latin American countries, which have two or three. 
   
PRC Military Activities in Colombia 
 
With respect to military engagement, the Colombian government continues to be very guarded in 
pursuing a relationship with the PRC. Such caution partly reflects its close security cooperation 
relationship with the United States and concern that excessive military activities with China 
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could damage that relationship.  In addition, Colombia has the distinction of being the only 
country to have fought alongside the United States against the Chinese in the Korean War, 
having sent three frigates and an infantry battalion to the conflict, serving with distinction, 
suffering 196 deaths and over 400 wounded. 
 
Yet despite motives for caution, Colombia has sporadically expanded its military engagement 
with the PRC. 
 
For at least a decade, Colombia has received modest gifts of military gear and equipment from 
China, typically totaling no more than $1 million per year. Nonetheless, in 
October 2013,the PRC donated seven military bridges to Colombia, and in April 2014, it gave 
the country two Harbin Y-12 military transport aircraft, which Colombia put in the service of 
the national air transport service Satena. 
 
Beyond materiel support, the Colombian military has also regularly conducts reciprocal visits 
with its institutional counterparts in China’s People’s Liberation Army. Indeed, the 
Colombian Superior War College has an official partnership agreement with China’s National 
Defense University. 
The Colombian Ministry of Defense has also sent officers to the PRC for training and 
professional military education courses, reportedly including extended trips for key Colombian 
military personnel and their spouses, paid for by the Chinese government. 
 
Reciprocally, Chinese military personnel have participated in the international version of 
Colombia’s elite Lanceros course on at least one occasion, and multiple times in Colombia’s 
course on de-mining. 
 
Conclusions 
 
While the PRC’s engagement with Colombia is limited and advancing erratically, it is expanding 
nonetheless, in ways that potentially affect Colombia’s other partners such as the United States. 
 
As Chinese companies, backed by the resources of Chinese banks, continue to learn about and 
adapt to the Colombian environment, they will doubtlessly become ever more effective in 
competing for public projects and commercial markets, including making better use of local 
partners, consultants, and employees. 
 
At the same time, it is probable that PRC-based companies, by tradition and preference, will 
always maintain some distance from their Colombian counterparts.  It is instructive that Chinese 
companies in Colombia have preferred to create their own business federation in Colombia, 
organized by the Chinese embassy, rather than participating more actively in those organizations 
open to all Colombians, such as ANDI, FENALCO, or the Sino-Colombian Chamber of 
Commerce.  Similarly, in the face of resistance to the presence of Chinese small merchants in 
Bogota, part of the Chinese response was to seek a special commercial district for Chinese 
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merchants, rather than attempting to more effectively integrate themselves with the other parts of 
the Colombian business community. 
 
Finally, the long history of close U.S.-Colombian military cooperation will continue to make 
Chinese-Colombian military engagement a matter of concern for the U.S., insofar as such 
engagement creates a risk of Chinese learning about U.S. systems, doctrine, and tactics, 
techniques and procedures, from their Colombian counterparts who have trained with U.S. forces 
and cooperated with the U.S. on missions.  Indeed, without the achievement of an understanding 
between the U.S. and Colombia regarding such activities, such Sino-Colombian military 
cooperation could arguably make it difficult for the U.S. to collaborate as closely with the 
Colombian government on security matters in the future. 
 
As in the rest of Latin America, engagement with the PRC represents both an opportunity and a 
challenge for Colombia.  As such, it will be increasingly important for Colombia’s political, 
business, and military leadership to have a clear vision of what they seek to achieve, how to get 
there, and the costs and risk they are willing to incur to do so.  The nation’s assumption of the 
leadership of the Pacific Alliance in Cali in June will be an important opportunity, but not the 
only one, as Colombia proceeds down the path that leads toward China and other partners in 
Asia. 
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